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THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS AT ORAL
ARGUMENT
E Barrett Prettyman, Jr. *
There was a time, not many years ago, when a lawyer could feel reason-
ably confident as he approached oral argument in the United States
Supreme Court if he had thoroughly absorbed the record in his case and
had obtained a working knowledge of all relevant cases. No longer. To-
day, an advocate must, more than ever before, prepare himself for a
stream of hypothetical questions touching not only on his own case but on
a variety of unrelated facts and situations.
To illustrate the point, I have picked a series of hypotheticals from oral
arguments chosen somewhat at random and reaching back over the last
several years. Hopefully, these will prove an aid to the advocate facing his
first, as well as his fifteenth, argument before the Court. Some of the hy-
potheticals should have been expected from Justices-and were not. Some
were so remote and complex that hardly anyone could have foreseen them.
Yet a few obviously were foreseen, and the answers prepared in advance.
The necessity to foresee and prepare is why I urge at least one, and possi-
bly several, moot courts before argument in the Supreme Court. Even the
most junior associate in a firm can sometimes develop a hypothetical situa-
tion that the advocate, in the midst of busy preparation, is not able to
anticipate. Finding the answer not only will help in preparing for similar
questions when the real argument comes but will force the advocate to
become used to answering hypotheticals generally.
I recall a moot court some years ago when a young associate in my office
came up with a hypothetical that had never occurred to me and for which I
had no answer. It was an extremely difficult one. I stewed over it for a
week before finally developing an answer that satisfied me. On argument
day, I had completed my presentation and was about to sit down when
Justice Stevens said, "By the way, counselor, what if * * *," and he pro-
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ceeded to ask the very hypothetical previously posed by my associate. My
ready response belied the fact that if that same question had been asked of
me without preparation, I would have been-at best-tongue-tied.
In the cases that follow, I have, by and large, listed questions only. An-
swers, in fact, have been included only where they are necessary to bridge
the gap between questions or where they are particularly significant for
some reason peculiar to themselves. (In one case, for example, the answer
is included to show that the advocate had precisely anticipated the hypo-
thetical posed to him.) I recognize that it is somewhat frustrating to read
questions without answers, but the purpose of this exercise is not to show
how (or how not) to give answers but rather to demonstrate the type of
inquiries the Justices are engaged in during this most recent period of the
Court's development.
The reader may well wonder why the Court is placing such a heavy
emphasis on hypotheticals-as opposed to the specifics of the cases con-
fronting the Justices. There could be several answers. One may be that
during prolonged periods of listening to argument, good and bad, the Jus-
tices are simply reaching for anything that varies the routine, dispels the
gloom, enlightens the proceedings, or adds lustre to an otherwise unvary-
ing occasion. A more generous view is that the Court is testing the outer
reaches both of what the advocate is asking it to declare and of what the
Court may, in fact, have to decide. "If we take this tack," the Justices are
asking, "how will it affect a different set of facts?" "What happens if we
add this or that variant?" "What are the outer limits of what you are pro-
posing?." "What will the next case look like?" "And the next?" "How
narrowly must we construct our decision in order to avoid all kinds of
problems?" "Or how broadly must we fashion it in order to cover the
essential points that may be troubling the lower courts?" It is a testing, a
probing, an evolving process that hopefully will illuminate the whole.
Then too, many hypotheticals are not addressed to counsel at all but to
fellow Justices. A hypothetical from one wing of the Court to another may
be a way of saying: "Look, if you start down that road, this is where it will
lead you." Or: "Do you really want to go as far as I think you are head-
ing, even if you have the votes?"
In any event, regardless of why hypotheticals are being used with in-
creasing frequency, they have indeed become a way of life in today's
Court, and no serious advocate can consider himself or herself even re-
motely prepared unless this aspect of the argument has been faced and





In Board of Education v. Pico,' the Court faced for the first time the issue
of whether a public school board, in order to promote the community's
"moral, social, and political values," could remove books which it found to
be objectionable from the shelves of junior and senior high school librar-
ies. The books removed in this case included The Naked Ape, Soul on Ice,
Slaughterhouse Five, and Best Short Stories by Negro Writers. The
Board's decision was attacked by students as being in violation of their
First Amendment rights. Among the questions asked of counsel:
Q. Suppose they [the Board] barred the St. James version of
the New Testament, and the Constitution of the United States,
and the Declaration of Independence?
Q. * * * Suppose some of these books were assigned as
outside reading, and the children were told, you can get it in the
public library?
Q. Suppose you had a book, counsel, that had been the sub-
ject of criminal proceedings, and conviction of someone in con-
nection with that book had been sustained, a criminal conviction.
Would you say that the book comes under this broad authority
you suggest?
Q. * * * [E]ven though it has been found to be criminally
pornographic, obscene?
Q. * * * Would you say that it would be appropriate to re-
move all books in the library that contained any disparaging re-
marks about blacks or Jews?
Q. Supposing they just removed one book. Would there be
ever any federal review of removal of one book?
Q. Well, supposing the one book you removed is removed
because it has disparaging remarks about Jews and blacks in it?
Q. If the board chose to remove books containing favorable
references to Republicans because it was a good Democratic
board, we should not let that go on to be examined?
Q. Do you concede that when a school board puts a book in
its library, it puts a stamp of approval on that book?
Q. Is it your position that a school board could remove a
book from the library solely on the grounds that it was offensive
to a particular religion?
Q. Let me put to you in that connection the question I put to
1. 457 U.s. 853 (1982).
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your friend. Suppose that a particular book is involved which
has already been found to be in violation of the criminal law as
obscene, pornographic. Could that be eliminated from the
library?
Q. Why is the judgment of the jury in that case determinative
other than theoretically it expresses the community's standard?
Is that your theory?
Q. * * * [U]nder New York law, if a school board took on
the responsibility which it has been suggested they haven't the
time to do it, but suppose they did take the responsibility and
said, here are 2,000 books that should be in the library, and no
books are to be added except if they are cleared with the school
board. Could they lawfully do that under New York law?
Q. Suppose it were agreed that the school board decided to
take off the shelves all books that they thought were vulgar, and
that there is an agreement that, yes, these books are vulgar by
anybody's standards. Your position is, I take it, that those books
could not be removed consistent with the First Amendment.
Q. Yes, it is short of obscenity, but let's just say that it is full
of words that most people would think are vulgar words.
Q. If a pupil disagrees with the outline used by the teacher, I
take it she would have standing or he would have standing.
Q. Yes. I assume you would say they can remove obscene
books from the library, if they are illegal. I think you answered
that. But are there any other books that they may remove from
the library?
Q. Well, * * supposing that these nine books had been ac-
quired by the school district, say, in 1970 or 1971 as a representa-
tive collection of the kind of protest literature of the sixties, * * *
and they had been kept there for ten years, and then there was a
series of books published about the history of early New York,
and there was a shelf space problem, and the school board de-
cided to get rid of this collection of the sixties because it was
somewhat passe, and to expose the students to the history of early
New York, since they couldn't do both. Now, there, there is no
problem of motivation at all, but you are getting rid of precisely
the same books.
Q. * * * [I]f the school board had appointed a committee, as
they did here, and they said, find out if there is too much-read
the book as a whole and consider its literary value, see if it has
any relevance to course material, and they had two or three other
[Vol. 33:555
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guidelines in there. Supposing the committee had come back, as
they did, and they maybe wrote a full report on each book, and
then the committee followed the recommendations, as they did
not here, and removed three books and kept five, or six, or
whatever the number is. You would say that was still unconstitu-
tional. Is that correct? And say that you can't dispute their judg-
ment. Each one, any impartial observer, a teacher, a book expert
would agree that they had faithfully followed the standards.
* * * What constitutional right of whom has been violated?
The Court was unable to reach a definitive resolution of the problems in
this case. Three Justices thought that if the School Board was motivated
by a dislike of the ideas in the removed books, it violated the students'
constitutional rights, and therefore the case should proceed to trial. One
Justice essentially agreed with this view but wrote separately. Another
also agreed that there should be a trial but did not want to decide the
extent of the Board's discretion. Four Justices dissented in four separate
opinions.
The Court, in United States v. Ross,2 was confronted-both philosoph-
ically and literally-with a small brown paper bag. A representative of the
Solicitor General's Office held it up to demonstrate the type of container
the Government claimed was not protected from warrantless searches, be-
cause it was not likely to contain personal effects. The defendant's lawyer
argued that the bag, which had been seized from the trunk of his client's
car and which contained narcotics, came within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. Counsel was asked:
Q. Is that bag stapled together?
A. No, it is not.
Q. Would it make any difference in your argument?
Q. * * * [Sluppose what they were hunting for was, say, a
waffle iron, a stolen waffle iron, or something else that couldn't go
in the paper bag. You might have probable cause to search the
car for the waffle iron, but if you got to the paper bag, you
wouldn't be searching it, would you?
Q. Are there problems being created in the application of the
rules that we are discussing here by the change in the structure of
automobiles, that is, the hatchbacks, the newer types of cars
where they do not have a trunk which is distinct from the rest of
the interior?
Q. Is that a problem, in terms of definitions, the change in
2. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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structure of cars? If not in this case, it conceivably would be in
some other cases, would it not?
Q. Suppose * * * that when they actually opened and tested
this container, this brown paper bag, and found that it was just
powdered sugar and nothing else, or some other innocuous sub-
ject, or substance, how much damage has the -have the privacy
interests of the person been impinged? How serious would that
be, if they have made a mistake?
Q. Supposing there had been a blanket over everything in the
trunk. Would they have been authorized to pick up the top of the
blanket and look underneath?
Q. * * * [W]ould you agree that had the paper bag been lo-
cated on the back seat of the vehicle, the police could have
opened it and examined the contents?
Q. And if it had been in the locked glove compartment, the
police could have opened the bag and examined the contents.
A. Correct.
Q. All right, and just because there is some little partition be-
tween the back seat and the trunk, there should be a different
rule. Is that it?
By a ruling of six to three, the Court upheld the government's position.
Since the officers had probable cause to stop the car and to believe that
contraband was concealed within it, the search could be as thorough as a
magistrate could have authorized in a warrant if he had issued one.
Thomas v. Review Board3 involved a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job
at an armaments factory after he was transferred to a department where he
would have had to help manufacture parts for tanks. When his unemploy-
ment benefits were denied, he brought suit, claiming that his action had
been taken because of sincerely held religious beliefs, and the denial vio-
lated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
Q. * * * [S]uppose that Mr. Thomas [the Jehovah's Wit-
ness] had reached the point where all work was against his reli-
gious convictions. Would you still be here?
Q. What [about] the Selective Service cases that were decided
in the late 60's and early 70's where it was held that an ethical or
sincerely held moral belief, even though nonreligiously founded,
was adequate for conscientious objection. What if his views
stemmed from that rather than from his membership in Jeho-
vah's Witnesses?
3. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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Q. * * * [W]hat if the Referee at the conclusion of the hear-
ing had said, I don't believe Mr. Thomas?
A. Well, then he could have concluded that Thomas quit for
personal reasons, but he didn't do that. In fact he said, the Refe-
ree, oh, I can understand, I can see your difficulty, and I have the
utmost respect for your religious principles. And I'm quoting
from the transcript. Those are the words of the Referee.
Q. And what if the Supreme Court of Indiana had said after
the Referee said what you have just quoted him as saying, we
find that the Referee committed reversible error in believing
Thomas?
Q. Is it a federal question on the narrow hypothetical Mr.
Justice White has just posed, that the state court has reversed the
Referee on what could be his credibility findings? Now, let's as-
sume, hypothetically, that reversing on credibility of witnesses
unseen by the reviewing court would be an error of some kind. Is
it a federal question error?
Q. Could the connection be so tenuous that the reviewing
courts could reverse? Let me take a hypothetical * * * in the
mean between some of the hypotheticals suggested. Suppose he
was working in a factory making threshing machines for farms
and he reasoned that threshing machines would be used to pro-
duce wheat which might go to Russia and he does not want, his
religious belief forbids his doing anything to help the communist
world. Would that be in your view too tenuous and speculative
to sustain a religious claim?
Q. What is the status of people, if any, in many of the courts,
who would have a religious objection and scruple against partici-
pating in social security?
Q. * * * [W]hat if at the time that your Mr. Thomas applied
for work at the foundry he was told that as a matter of company
policy someone who is in the roll mill automatically at the end of
six months would be placed, rotated to the tank production
department?
Q. Could I ask you, suppose that his request to the Jehovah's
Witnesses had been answered by the religious body saying,
there's nothing contrary to our religion to work in the turret fac-
tory. And he said, well, that's maybe your view of it as a group,
but my own personal religious beliefs prevent me from doing so.
Q. * * * What if he says, well, I just don't believe I
should-I just don't believe in war.
A. Well, that is consistent with the tenet of the Jehovah's
1984]
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Witnesses and would also be a belief protected by the First
Amendment.
Q. And you would say the same thing, then, if a person went
to his employer and said, I can't work in a turret factory, I'm
going to quit, and the employer said, well, why? I have a reli-
gious belief. And his employer said, well, what religion are you a
member of? And he says, none except mine. I'm a one-man, I
have a one-man religion. And-but it's religious. I think it's
contrary to the laws of God to go to war or to even work on the
implements of war. * * *
Q. What if he said, I'm an atheist but I'm opposed to all
wars?
Q. But does that necessarily follow? Supposing you had a
Catholic nurse employed in a hospital and was transferred into
the abortion ward, and she said, well, it's against my religion to
work in abortions and then they defend it on the grounds, well,
some other Catholics will perform these services, therefore your
belief is not religious, is not sincere.
The Court, eight to one, agreed with Mr. Thomas and held that it vio-
lated the First Amendment for the state to deny him compensation benefits
because of his religious beliefs.
The Court in Village of Hoffman Estates v. F1ivside' faced the constitu-
tionality of a "head shop" law under which an Illinois village attempted to
regulate the sale of drug paraphernalia. The Seventh Circuit had held the
law too vague as applied to a boutique called Flipside that sold cigarette
rolling paper, water pipes, and other items that might have fallen within
reach of the law.
Q. Suppose * * * the proprietor of Flipside is in the store,
and two people come in and say, we use marijuana considerably,
* * * and tells him some specific item that they want to use in
connection with using marijuana, in which case there is no ques-
tion about what the use is going to be, and if Mr. Flipside sells
the article requested, would there be any question in his mind or
could there be that the ordinance would forbid that?
Q. What if this ordinance, instead of reading the way it did,
had simply regulated the sale of hypodermic needles?
Q. Well, if you hold the belief that the sale of morphine
ought to be lawful, does that make the Harrison Act[5]
4. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
5. The Harrison Narcotic Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-969 (1982)), is a narcotics control act. It is designed to regulate the use of certain




Q. Would you think it would be unlawful if there was an or-
dinance or a statute that prohibited the public display, sale with-
out a license of pistols with barrels less than five inches?
A. It certainly would not be vague. Whether or not it is un-
lawful is, I think-
Q. Well, it is a lawful instrument if a policeman is using it, is
it not?
Q. Would you say it would have some impact on your case if
along with all this paraphernalia they had a sign reading gener-
ally, forget your troubles, escape from you anxieties, et cetera?
The Court upheld the ordinance (eight to zero), ruling that it was not
facially overbroad or vague, and it was reasonably clear in its application
to Flipside. The ordinance regulated the commercial marketing of items
that the labels revealed might be used for an illicit purpose.
The issue before tht Court in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman6 was whether, as contended by Pennsylvania, the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act constituted simply a
statement of federal policy, encouraged by federal funding, or whether it
established a right to individually determined habilitation in the least re-
strictive environment, as contended by a resident of the Pennhurst
facilities.
Q. Then you don't agree with your friend that the State of
Pennsylvania could, or any other state, could close all of its insti-
tutions and simply say, people will have to take care of their own,
as they did 100 or 200 years ago?
Q. What if * * * the state simply had never set about to cre-
ate any sort of institution for the mentally retarded? Would you
say that the federal Constitution required them affirmatively to
set up such?
Q. Can Congress in 1960 say, we grant you X million dollars
on these conditions and the state accepts the money on those con-
ditions and complies with the conditions, and then in 1970 can
Congress come along and impose additional conditions upon the
1960 grant? * * *
Q. May I ask a question along those lines? May a state with-
draw entirely, now, from any federal support for this sort of
program?
the illicit trafficking of a variety of drugs, including morphine, and impose criminal sanc-
tions on those violating its provisions. For a discussion of the effect of the Act, see United
States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
6. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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Q. What if Congress cut off appropriations for the [Section]
6010-type programs?
Q. I'm talking about the Chief Justice's hypothetical. Con-
gress cut off the money. And you say you'd go into court. For
what?
Q. Now, then, take it one more step. When the State of
Pennsylvania stops appropriating money, just say, we can't afford
this program, or we think it's wasteful, or whatever, the Legisla-
ture just doesn't give it any more money. What then?
Q. May I interrupt long enough to ask you a question about
how you think [section] 6010(3) would actually operate under
these circumstances? Let's assume it would take $100 million for
the state to comply with the obligations, the conditions, the re-
quirements of section 6010(3). And let's assume further, the fed-
eral government was willing to put up $1 million, leaving $99
million to be put up by the state legislature. And let's assume the
state legislature said, we don't have $99 million, we have-say-
$79 million. May a federal court issue an injunction against the
state legislature to borrow the money and put the additional
funds up?
Q. But I'm asking what is a hypothetical question. I want to
know under what circumstances may a federal court issue an in-
junction against the legislature of Pennsylvania to provide such
additional state funds as may be necessary to meet these
standards?
Q. Now, let's assume the money, this state money just stops,
and no more state money is available, and what's the remedy
then?
The following exchange indicates where hypotheticals such as these can
take the advocate, even to the chagrin of another Justice:
Q. Well, if [section] 6010 was enacted exclusively under Con-
gress's spending power, then I suppose the state could withdraw,
and not accept any federal spending.
A. Yes, Your Honor, that is-
Q. If on the other hand it were enacted under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, then perhaps a state couldn't withdraw.
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. And that's your position?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. They cannot quit.
[Vol. 33:555
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Q. [Another Justice] Well, he doesn't need to take a position.
A. Exactly, Your Honor, and-
Q. But he has taken a position.
The Court held, six to three, that Congress, acting pursuant to its spend-
ing power, created no substantive rights to "appropriate treatment" in the
least restrictive environment. Nor did the Act condition the grant of fed-
eral funds on the State's agreeing to underwrite certain obligations to the
developmentally disabled.
In re R.M.J. 7 raised the question of whether Missouri could, consistent
with the First Amendment, prohibit an attorney from advertising the
courts in which he was admitted to practice, advertising that he practiced
law in certain fields designed by terms not approved by the State, and
mailing announcements of his office opening to persons with whom he was
not acquainted.
Q. * * * [A]s to the particular facts of this case, supposing
we were to conclude that under Bates [v. State Bar ofArizona8],
the rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Missouri were uncon-
stitutional. Would we be free to roam at large beyond this partic-
ular rule and say that A, B, C, D are permitted, but E, F, G are
not?
Q. Would it be appropriate in your view for a lawyer who
practiced personal injury law to say that my average verdicts over
the past twelve months have been $129,000, assuming that is a
fact?
Q. * * [T]hinking about mail advertising, let's assume that
a lawyer had access to the names of people who were admitted to
the emergency room of a great hospital in a large city. Could he
use that list of names to send invitations to come to see him when
they got well enough?
A. I thought I might be asked that question, Your Honor.
Q. * * * [H]ow far does that Rule 20 go? Under our Rule 5,
after you have paid your $100, you get a nice, pretty certificate.
You have it framed, and you hang it on your office wall or hang
it in your window, or on the front door. Does this Rule prohibit
that?
Q. What about a young lawyer sending out an advertisement
that he had never lost a case?
Q. * * * Suppose you are employed in the Solicitor Gen-
7. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
8. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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eral's office. We have had members of that staff who have argued
as many as fifty cases here. Now, if they go back to practice in
Missouri, you don't think they would be qualified to advertise
that they are admitted to practice here, and have?
A. You might have an ad in which one says, I have argued
fifty cases in the Supreme Court. * * *
Q. But that is very different from the hypothetical I was sug-
gesting to you. I said that the possession of that certificate stand-
ing alone, by which I meant to exclude any experience in this
Court, doesn't add anything to the person's qualifications except
that it is a representation by this Court that we found that he was
admitted in the state of Missouri or wherever.
Q. * * * Do you think that it would be proper and not sub-
ject to state bar regulation for an attorney to send out letters to
people who are listed in the newspaper as being widows of re-
cently deceased spouses, listing an area of expertise or practice as
representation of widows? Is that something that the state could
not properly reach?
Q. * * * [W]hat about the certificate of admission to the bar
of this Court that you post in your office? Does that come within
the prohibition?
Q. And here in Washington, every firm has a string that peo-
ple asterisk, licensed to practice in California, but not in the Dis-
trict, and so forth and so on, right on their letterhead. * * * Is
this all right? Would it be all right under your Missouri bar
rules?
Q. In Justice Blackmun's question, with the asterisks showing
admitted to practice in California but not in the District, might
not that supply an additional element of truth, if the firm's letter-
head says Washington, D.C., and lists these people as partners,
but then the asterisks show that they are not actually admitted to
practice in the District, but only in California?
Q. * * * Suppose a state bar accuses someone, a lawyer, of
doing A and B, and whoever is the adjudicator finds that he does
both A and B, and they suspend him for doingA and B. It hap-
pens that they may not constitutionally prevent him from doing
A, but they can prevent him from doing B. Well, he has done
both of them. Now, did you agree with * * * Justice Brennan
that the Stromberg /v. California9], rule would apply in that situa-
tion, that the suspension must be lifted?
The Court unanimously concluded that none of the restrictions imposed
9. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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by the State could be sustained in light of the attorney's First Amendment
rights. There was nothing inherently misleading, or misleading in practice,
about the challenged conduct.
The name of the case, National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology
Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City," was indicative of the length and
complexity of its hypotheticals. It was a Sherman Act case involving a
Blue Cross policy that required a hospital, before applying for Blue Cross
membership, to obtain a certificate of need from a federally authorized
health services planning group-in this case, Mid-America Health Systems
Agency, or MAHSA. The Eighth Circuit found this policy by Blue Cross
to be impliedly immune from antitrust attack by virtue of the underlying
federal health care statute.
Q. Well * * *, what if the Missouri Legislature had taken up
a proposal for the formation of a state regulatory body and come
to the conclusion that 95% of Missourians were Christian Scien-
tists, and so they simply didn't want anything to do with this and
they didn't want any hospital building in the state; and so they
enacted a statute saying, there will be no hospitals constructed in
the state for two years?
Q. You wouldn't think that, apparently, that Justice Rehn-
quist's hypothetical enactment was a valid zoning ordinance?
Q. * * * I take it there's no provision or indication in the
federal law that if Blue Cross had chosen to make a contract with
this hospital, despite the refusal of a certificate of need from
MAHSA that there would have been no violation of federal law?
A. Well, let me say, MAHSA never refused to issue a certifi-
cate of need.
Q. Well, assume it had, though.
A. Assume it had? That would be simply two private groups
agreeing together that they would-
Q. Yes, but suppose MAHSA had refused to certify this,
what did it do that led Blue Cross to refuse to make the contract?
Q. Well, what if it had read it as meaning that this facility
wasn't needed, exactly the way it read it now, but had said, well,
nevertheless, we're going to make a contract with the-that
would not have violated any federal law?
Q. * * * [S]upposing, though, that Missouri had authorized
the program and then the planning agency, whatever its proper
name is, refused to designate the hospital, give it the certificate,
and thereafter Blue Cross entered into the contract with them.
10. 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
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Then would it have violated federal law? In other words, if you
had a state program in place and the state program did not certify
a new hospital, would the federal statute be violated if Blue Cross
decided to insure the hospital?
Q. Would it violate the statute for Blue Cross to say, well,
we'll go ahead and insure you anyway?
Q. Well, let me rephrase the question. Supposing you had a
state agency and it granted one hospital a certificate of need and
another one it did not. And I assume the first one could get fed-
eral funding and all sorts of things. The second one, I assume,
would not be eligible for federal funds but would it violate any
federal law if it nevertheless went ahead and offered its hospital
services available to the general public?
Q. Nor would it violate a federal law if Blue Cross made a
contract with it?
Q. What is the scope * * * of the implied repeal. In other
words, would it cover a group, say, a group of contractors who
refuse to enter into a contract with a new hospital unless it first
got a certificate of need?
Q. Would it cover then, say, a group of contractors who re-
fuse to build a hospital or a group of doctors who refuse to offer
their services unless they get-would it cover all kinds of collu-
sive activity or cooperative activity designed to prevent the con-
struction of a new hospital?
Q. Anything that MAHSA could talk anybody into doing,
whether they were required to do it or not, is exempt?
Q. Could * * * Blue Cross turn it over to a subsidiary called
the Hospital Opportunists Association?
Q. * * * For example, if MAHSA appeared at the statewide
meeting of the druggists, the wholesale druggists in Missouri, and
said, we recommend that you all agree not to sell this hospital
any drugs, and they thought that was a good idea since they
wanted to-so they passed a resolution, and everybody agreed
that they wouldn't sell any. Do you say that that would be ex-
empt because MAHSA had recommended it, because they were
authorized to seek the cooperation of private parties? They
sought the cooperation and they got it. That's the end of it.
Q. Could Blue Cross have acted without MAHSA and you
still have your same position?
Q. Suppose * * * that a state law set up a state health plan-
ning agency and authorized it to make some plans about hospi-
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tals and avoid having too many hospital beds and authorized it to
seek the cooperation of private interests in effecting its recom-
mendations. And this state agency went around to a group of
pharmaceutical people and recommended that they refuse to sell
to a new hospital. Now, certainly, that wouldn't be within the
Parker v. Brown ["i] exemption, would it?
A. * * * I say that that's what Congress said in the 1974 act
in the twenty-eight words. * * * There's no doubt about those
twenty-eight words being the basis of our position.
Q. If you lose one of them, do you lose?
A. Pardon me?
Q. Suppose you've only got twenty-six of them.
Q. So you're saying this is no different than if the statute had
authorized the secretary of one of the departments to go out in
the field and try to talk people, private parties into preventing
excess hospital beds, and the Secretary of Health went out to the
pharmaceutical convention and persuaded them not to sell to the
new hospital?
Q. And so you think, then, that the pharmaceutical people,
although they weren't required to do that at all, by the federal
law, and couldn't have been told to do it by the Secretary, they're
nevertheless exempt?
Q. * * * [S]uppose-I'll try a hypothetical-that the federal
government, the Congress, developed the idea erroneously or
otherwise, that the country needed more lawyers, and provided
for $500 million for matching grants to the states to build addi-
tional law schools but required that no grant would be made to a
state unless the bar association of that state certified that there
was a need for a law school and specified the size and capacity of
that law school. Would you think there'd be some analogy with
what you've got here?
Q. Well, is there any analogy with respect to a bar association
being a private entity as against a governmental entity, and yet
having in mind that the bar association would probably be about
as qualified to determine need for a new law school as anyone
could possibly be?
Q. Well, is your suggestion that after Blue Cross had sat on
the board of MAHSA and the MAHSA as a unit had said, the
number one priority is oversupply of bids, it would have been in
effect reneging on its role in MAHSA if it had gone ahead and
paid the plaintiff in this case?
11. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and held against the Blue
Cross policy. Implied antitrust immunity can be justified only by a con-
vincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the
regulatory system, which was lacking here.
The Establishment Clause was pitted against the Free Exercise, Free
Speech and Free Association Clauses of the Constitution in Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 2 a Missouri case involving a tax-supported university's ban against a
student group's use of campus facilities for religious services and training.
Did the usage sought by the students merely accommodate religion, as
contended by a student religious group, or did it advance religion by ap-
pearing to give university approval and providing aid with tax dollars?
Q. The university system in Missouri has recognized the right
of a gay rights unit, as I understand [it], to meet on the campus
and hold discussions and exchange views, has it not?
Q. * * * How about the Young Marxists League, if they had
one on the campus, would they be permitted to meet to make
attacks on the Democratic system of government and express
their views?
Q. Could they sign up Jerry Falwell for once a month for a
regular appearance on the campus?
Q. How about someone like William Kuntzler or someone
who had defended one of the groups in the late sixties?
Q. * * * Well, what if the program consisted of a reading of,
say, four chapters of one of the gospels, followed by a student
discussion of the content of those chapters and criticism and ex-
change and so forth?
Q. In one of the hypotheticals presented, you said it would
depend upon the content of what the speaker said. Do you not
run afoul [of] the free speech question by the fact that this Court
has spoken often of the fact that if an individual is deprived of
religious worship opportunities by something that the govern-
ment has done; i e., a soldier in the field a prisoner-
A. * * * I think the Court has often held that that would be
hostile to religion to not permit the opportunity for those individ-
uals to worship just because of the fact that they have been de-
prived of their other already-immediate access to such services.
Q. Well, what if the campus is out in the middle of the desert
or something like that?
Q. Well, do you think a religious service could be banned in
12. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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a public park in Kansas City? Or, as someone suggested, the
Reverend Falwell from speaking there?
Q. Let's assume it's exactly like the student building involved
here; it's open for all other groups, as your answers to other ques-
tions have indicated. Could the city foreclose use for religious
purposes of a public park of that character?
Q. What about services which begin at the Lincoln Memorial
sometimes with prayers and hymns being sung, and then even
more specifically a religious service, the Mass held on the Mall
when Pope John Paul II was here several years ago?
Q. How about the Christmas tree on the Mall every
Christmas?
Q. And the creche.
Q. [D]oes it disturb you that members of the Congress of the
United States have prayer breakfasts in the National Capitol
Building on a regular basis?
Q. * * * I assume you were here at 10:00 o'clock this morn-
ing when the Marshal of the Court in announcing the Court pro-
nounced, in effect, a very short benediction when he said God
save the United States and this honorable Court. Is that any dif-
ferent from a ten-minute prayer?
Q. Could the university preclude the use of those meeting
rooms for all purposes if it wanted to, except classes of the
university?
Q. Let me ask you, suppose a group of students organize a
denomination of a particular religion on the campus, and they
say well, we have to have someplace regularly to meet like others.
And they have a minister who will come and preach to them at
these meetings, and they want the university to let them use, say,
one of its buildings as their church. And they frankly say, we
can't afford a church but if we had a church, we would meet in it,
but we don't, and we want to use your building as a church.
Now, you would be making the same argument, wouldn't you?
Or would you?
Q. Would there be anything to interfere with the university
saying that there would be a fixed fee for the use of the room by
any group including this church group that is hypothesized?
Q. What if the Missouri Constitution contained a clause say-
ing that there shall be no requirement of freedom of speech or
that the state shall allow freedom of speech in its state and it shall
regulate it as it sees fit. Would you think that that would be a
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compelling state interest for defense against a claim that the fed-
eral First Amendment was being violated?
Q. But what if a state had a constitutional provision diametri-
cally opposite to the First Amendment that said the state shall be
able to freely regulate discussion of public topics? Would you
think that was a compelling state interest if the state were
charged with violating the federal First Amendment?
Q. I take it, for example, a Roman Catholic Church couldn't
have a Mass under this regulation, but what about the Holy
Name Society having a meeting?
Q. But if the university rents its facilities to off-campus
groups for a fee, your position would be, I take it, that if the
Catholic Church wanted to rent one of its buildings on a regular
basis to hold its church services, that the university would have to
rent it.
Q. [D]o you see any differences between the circum-
stances here involving a university and the use of its premises as
opposed to that of a high school or a grammar school?
The Court, with only one dissent, sided with the students, holding that
their free exercise of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
had been violated. The university, having made its facilities generally
available for the activities of registered student groups, could not close its
facilities just because a group wanted to use them for religious worship and
discussion. In other words, the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy
of equal access.
The Court in Bulfington v. Missouri'3 was asked to decide whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevented the State of
Missouri from seeking a death penalty for the second time after the de-
fendant's conviction had been reversed and the jury, at a separate proceed-
ing following the first trial, had turned down the death penalty and
imposed life imprisonment.
Q. * * * [W]hat if your client had been convicted by the
jury or the judge and sentenced to the death penalty in the first
proceeding and it was set aside on the Duren /v. Missouri]
ground?[14]
13. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
14. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). In Duren the petitioner, convicted of first degree murder and
robbery in a Missouri court, challenged the jury selection process, arguing that it failed to
comply with the "fair-cross-section" requirement set forth by the Court in Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
The Supreme Court held that the jury-selection system, which provided women with an
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Q. Supposing your procedure required the jury to make spe-
cial verdicts, and they had found that pursuant to Instruction No.
38 even though the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, as a matter of leniency we will not
impose the death penalty.
Q. My question is, what is your position if the jury had * * *
articulated a basis for a decision that it was pursuant to this in-
struction rather than to any deficiency in the prosecutor's proof?.
Q. Well, what if the original conviction had been reversed for
failure to suppress testimony secured in violation of Miranda?
Would you say that the double jeopardy provision barred retrial
with the possibility of the death penalty?
Q. Well, what about the situation where you have another
panel of twelve jurors and this panel of twelve jurors happens to
believe three or four prosecution witnesses that the earlier panel
did not believe?
Q. * * * Suppose there was a jury [that] came in and said,
we find, we impose life because the mitigating circumstances out-
weigh the aggravating ones?
Q. Well, what if they said, we find that aggravating circum-
stance A was not present? Could you then on retrial press that
same aggravating circumstance?
Q. Well, if you assume that the jury imposed life because
they found there were no aggravating circumstances you have a
problem about pressing the same aggravating circumstances, if
you just assumed that that's what the jury did. I would take your
case as not so clear either if the jury said there are both aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, but the mitigating circum-
stances outweigh the aggravating circumstances and the State on
retrial says, we're going to present precisely the same evidence.
Q. * * * [S]uppose the statute said that you can be guilty of
first degree murder and second degree murder, which I assume
you have in Missouri. * * * And if you're convicted of second
degree murder, you're acquitted on first.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So why isn't it automatically true that if you are found
option to be exempted on request from the jury venire, violated the "fair-cross-section" re-
quirement of the Sixth Amendment. The Court determined that women constituted a suffi-
ciently distinct group in the community and that the system, which resulted in venires
composed of only 15% women in a county composed of 54% women, unconstitutionally
denied petitioner Sixth Amendment protection.
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guilty of life imprisonment you are acquitted as to death? When
you boil it down, that's what they're arguing, isn't it?
Q. Well, what would be the difference if they said that you
can get life for one [degree of crime] or 100 years for the other,
and it was the degree [that] was used? * * * [Y]ou'd go with the
first, wouldn't you?
Q. Well, if Missouri says, if you killed somebody with aggra-
vating circumstances, you are subject to conviction of first degree
murder and death. If you are guilty of homicide without those
problems, you are guilty of second degree murder and sentenced
to life. Right? Are you with me?
A. Yes.
Q. And the jury brings in a second degree verdict, life. Can
you try him again on first degree?
A. No.
Q. So the only difference is words?
Q. I hope you realize that my hypothetical didn't say any-
thing about limited to death.
Q. To put the question more directly, supposing Missouri
had a procedure that if the jury does what it did in this case, find
no death penalty is appropriate, would it be constitutionally per-
missible for the state to say, well, there shall be an appeal to an
appellate court which could reverse that determination and de-
cide that, well, we think there should be a death penalty, evi-
dence of aggravating circumstances are pretty strong, and so
forth?
Q. What about a procedure that said, we'll have a bifurcated
hearing except that if the jury finds no death penalty we'll have a
second jury empaneled and have them take another look at it and
have a trial? I suppose that'd be permissible too. To just specifi-
cally say, the state shall have two chances to persuade someone
that the death penalty is appropriate? That's, I guess, what they
have in Florida?
A. Well, sort of.
Q. Would you think that would be permissible
constitutionally?
Q. You would have exactly the same issue as you have in this
case, wouldn't you?
Q. Suppose, counsel, that you had gone for a new trial on the
grounds that through some mistaken inadvertence one of the
twelve jurors that had rendered the verdict was not a citizen of
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the United States and therefore there was not a duly constituted
jury. Then your claim would be there was no verdict at all,
wouldn't you?
The Court accepted the defendant's argument five to four, ruling that
the State could not seek a death penalty for the second time. Great em-
phasis was put on the fact that Missouri's separate presentencing hearing
was like a trial on the question of guilt or innocence, so that the protection
available under the Double Jeopardy Clause attached.
In American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,'5 the
Court was faced with a standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) limiting worker exposure to cotton
dust. The textile industry argued that the underlying Act required OSHA
to demonstrate that its standard reflected a reasonable relationship be-
tween the costs and benefits involved, whereas the government contended
that the Act mandated the most protective standard possible to eliminate a
material health impairment.
Q. [I]f while the Benzene case[ 16] was pending here, the
Board had revoked its carcinogen policy, as you say it now has,
would we have remanded that Benzene case for reconsideration?
Q. * * * [Clan you hypothesize circumstances in which a
major industry, producing things we regard as necessary, that is,
the entire automobile industry and the entire lumber industry,
the entire cotton industry-can you hypothesize any situation in
which it could be simply closed down and stopped, by operation
of law?
Q. Could it be done that way? Could the Congress of the
United States, through its mechanisms such as we have here, in
effect say, no more automobiles shall be produced because
automobiles kill 63,000 people a year and injure two million peo-
ple a year * *?
Q.* * * How much of the industry must be destroyed
before it's no longer feasible [because the industry is destroyed]?
Supposing that-say the figure is 25% and supposing 25% of the
firms would go out of business but the remaining 75% would be
able to expand their production and continue to produce the
same aggregate amount of goods. Would that be feasible or not
feasible under your standard?
15. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
16. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), which had
been heard the previous Term, had presented the same issues, but the Court had not decided
them.
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Q. Let me pursue the hypothetical question I put to you ear-
lier * * *. In your view, would Congress have the constitutional
authority to bar cigarettes, for example, unless they can demon-
strate that all negative health factors were eliminated? Could
Congress do that itself via statute?
Q. Second question: could they delegate that, by a structure
somewhat like the usual pattern of creating a commission like
OSHA, could they delegate that to a commission on tobacco
hazards?
Q. [Is there] [a]nything to prevent Congress from, or OSHA,
from providing that no imports would be permitted in this coun-
try unless the sources complied with OSHA's standards?
Q. Well, do you mean by that, that if the record showed that
compliance would increase the cost of cotton to the ultimate con-
sumer by 500%, that then we could go ahead?
Q. * * * I'd like to come back with a question that I put to
[your opponent], is it the government's position that this standard
would be perfectly valid under the act if it destroyed 50% of the
cotton industry in the United States, whether you measure it by
number of companies or by total output, was that the govern-
ment's position?
In an extraordinarily complex and technical opinion, the Court ruled
five to three that OSHA was not required to conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis, because Congress had already struck a balance by requiring only that
the standard be "feasible."
HL v. Matheson 1" involved a Utah statute which required every physi-
cian in the state, under threat of criminal penalties, to attempt to notify a
minor female's parents before performing an abortion on her. The plain-
tiff was a fifteen-year-old unmarried female who lived with her parents but
did not want them informed that she was seeking an abortion in the first
trimester of her pregnancy. She had made her decision after consulting
others, including a social worker. The statute was attacked as invading the
plaintiff's right of privacy under the Due Process Clause.
Q. [You] have emphasized the importance of getting counsel
and advice and assistance, lawyers, social workers, doctors. And
you rest on the fact that she had the advice and counsel of all
these people? * * * What if she has the advice of no one? Just
walked in off the street and said, I want to have an abortion, and
the doctor said, not unless I notify the parents. No other factors.
17. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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Would this be any different from the points that you have got
here?
Q. * * * It would make no difference, would it?
A. No. If she has the right of privacy, to go ahead on her
own, then she has that right.
Q. Suppose she were twelve? Same?
Q. What about ten years of age?
Q. In Utah, under Utah law, if she had walked in, a girl of
ten, eleven, twelve, fifteen, whatever, and said, I want my tonsils
taken out but my parents won't send me to a doctor and won't
agree to it, would the doctor be legally permitted to perform the
tonsillectomy?
Q. Had the doctor written a letter simply stating the simple,
direct fact that your daughter has come to me to have an abortion
performed and I'm prepared to do it, and under the statute I'm
giving you notice that I will proceed with this procedure seven
days from today, would he have complied with the statute?
Q. Does the minor living at home have standing to challenge
the statute on the ground that it's overbroad as to minors who are
not living at home?
Q. * * * [L]et's assume that the Supreme Court of your state
has already decided that the statute on its face is constitutional.
On the other hand, the federal court out in your state has decided
that as applied to an emancipated minor the statute, if it does
apply to an emanicipated minor, is unconstitutional.
Q. * * * [I]s it possible that it's inherent in the case, that the
parents might be able to give something of the medical history
and background of the child which would be relevant to the doc-
tor and his decision?
Q. * * * Suppose he's about ready to perform the abortion.
Before he does he picks up the telephone, he gets hold of the
mother of the girl, and he says, I have your daughter here, I'm
about to perform an abortion. Goodbye. Does that do it?
Q. What if the mother in that hypothetical case then said, are
you aware, doctor, that our daughter has been under psychiatric
care for the last seven years, and the doctors says, no, I'm not
aware of that. * * *
Q. So you'd say it would be equally unconstitutional if there
was a requirement that two hours after an abortion is performed
they notify the parents because they might be unhappy about it?
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The Court, with four opinions, held the Utah statute constitutional by a
vote of six to three. The statute was deemed to be narrowly drawn to pro-
tect important state interest, since it was restricted to minors, contained
only a notice requirement, and gave no veto powers to the parents. The
majority stressed that the statute provided the parents an opportunity "to
supply essential medical and other information to a physician."18
An example of how one hypothetical can be woven and expanded by
one Justice and then picked up and changed by others transpired in J.
Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. ,19 a Robinson-Patman case. As
an incentive, Chrysler gave a rebate on cars sold by dealers who in turn
met certain sales quotas. A dealer who did not meet the quotas charged
price discrimination. The issue revolved around the type of evidence
needed to prove injury.
Q. Well, counsel, suppose before a discrimination takes
place, two competitors are each selling 500 cars a year and then
the manufacturer lowers the price to one of the dealers but not to
the other. Afterwards, they are both selling 500 cars a year, and
the only thing that's happened is that the disfavored dealer is not
making the same profit as his competitor, and he has lost profits,
but he hasn't lost any sales. He's lost profits. Now is that enough
to give rise to injury?
Q. Well, my example to you, though, the 500-car example,
the disfavored dealer is making the same profit, after the discrim-
ination. He just isn't making the profit his competitor is. Can
you say he lost profits?
Q. The fact is, though, that after the discrimination, in my
example, the favored dealer didn't pick up any sales.
Q. Well, what about in my example of the two dealers with
each selling 500 cars? Suppose I vary that. Each of them is sell-
ing 500 cars before a discrimination takes place. And then the
manufacturer raises the price to the disfavored dealer, keeps the
price the same to the favored dealer, and afterwards they both
sell exactly the same number of cars; the only thing is, the disfa-
vored dealer isn't making the same unit profit, net profit, that he
was before. Is that proof of injury to his business?
Q. Well, they were both competing with one another. I cer-
18. Id. at 411.
19. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
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tainly will put that in it. But the only thing that happens, they
both sell the same number of cars afterwards, but the disfavored
dealer isn't making-he's just lost profits, that's all.
Q. Therefore, in answer to my brother White's question, your
answer would be that in his hypothetical case there wouldn't be a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, because there would not
be injury to competition, since each dealer continued to sell the
same number of cars as he had in the past.
Q. Let me ask you, * * * supposing that the two dealers han-
dled both the Chrysler cars and also General Motors cars, and
General Motors and Chrysler agreed to charge a higher price to
one than the other. And they did that, and they nevertheless con-
tinued to sell 500 cars apiece. Would there be any violation of
law?
Q. You've got a violation of the Sherman Act. Would you
have any injury to either one of them?
Q. Well, how can you say that? If there had been no incen-
tive programs, maybe we would just have had a uniform price
reduction to both. Instead of charging initially a higher price fol-
lowed by rebate, you might start out with a lower net price in the
first instance to avoid the violation.
Q. I suppose instead of initially charging $5,000 and later re-
bating $500, you might initially just charge $4,500. That would
be-and if you did that, instead of having a rebate program, I
suppose that the disfavored purchaser would have been better off.
Q. Would the case be different if instead of a rebate you orig-
inally had a list price of $4,500 and then without announcing it
publicly they wrote a letter to Payne [the dealer] that said that
we've decided to charge you $5,000 a car from now on, and they
just raised the price to Payne without-Payne never did know
what his competitors were getting, anything like that? Secretly,
he had to pay a higher price. Would he have a cause of action?
He still sold the same amount of cars, just made less money on
each one.
Q. But if they raised the price by agreeing with their competi-
tor to do it, why then, of course he would have an injury?
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Q. But it is applicable to suggest that my hypothetical, or
maybe Justice White's hypothetical, that sales to two different
prices, where there is no transfer of business back and forth,
would violate the Robinson-Patman Act in a proceeding brought
by the Commission?
Q. Well, he says, I own the business, I know how many cars
I've been selling lately, and I know that I haven't been able to sell
as many cars as I used to.
Q. Well, if he had just said, by the way, and what I mean is, I
lost twenty sales. That would be enough?
Q. Or does he-should he have to call an accountant and get
out his records, that sort of thing?
Q. Well, he says, I lost sales in the amount of $80,000, out of
which I could have made $80,000 in profit. Is that enough?
Q. Well, if the judge were to say to him, I believe you all
right, but you have to prove it with some papers. Is that what
you suggest?
Q. Conclusory is something that one usually hears applied to
pleadings rather than evidence. Suppose in a personal injury ac-
tion, a plaintiff gets on the stand and says, I paid out-of-pocket
$2,500 in medical bills, and he's not cross-examined about it and
it's a bench trial and the judge makes a finding of fact, the plain-
tiff paid out of pocket $2,500 in medical bills. The plaintiff has
never produced a single bill. * * * Could the judge give him
damages? Of course he could.
The Court vacated and remanded five to four, holding that a plaintiff
under section 4 of the Clayton Act must make some showing of actual
injury in order to recover damages, but that the Court of Appeals had
failed to pass upon whether Chrysler was such a "wrongdoer" as to be
unable to insist upon a rigorous standard of proof.
The kind of case in which the Court can have a field day with hypotheti-
cal questions is illustrated by United States v. Turkette,2° involving the
question of whether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) applies when the "enterprise" is not partly illegal but entirely
so. The First Circuit held not--that RICO was intended solely to protect
legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and did not
20. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
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make it illegal to participate in an entirely illegal enterprise. This led to
the Bridge Club Hypothetical.
Q. Under the First Circuit theory, on which side of the line
would fall an enterprise that had an apparently legitimate front,
that is, a truck line, or whatever, but was * * * engaged 75% or
90% in shooting for hire, killing for hire, arson for hire, and ex-
tortion and loan sharking. Where would the First Circuit case
take us?
A. * * * In your hypothetical, for example, as I understand
it, it's impossible to know what are the salient considerations or
the proportion of legal and illegal activities-
Q. You think that's irrelevant? What the proportion is?
Q. After your answers to my colleagues' questions, I get back
to the question I asked you * * *. If an individual may be an
enterprise and a group of persons who commit a pattern of activi-
ties, that is, two predicate acts, may also be an enterprise, then
how-what is the difference between them and an illegal
enterprise?
A. * * * Well I think if you had some informal group of
individuals who formed a civic association or a bridge club or
something like that, there would be no entity in the legal sense.
Q. This even reaches bridge clubs, does it?
Q. But even as my brother White just suggested, what if they
play for money?
Q. The bridge club might be prosecuted under RICO?
Q. Tell me, * * * does that go this far-say two men robbed
a bakery * * *. They never see one another for another eight
years and then they run into one another and they decide, let's go
ahead and rob another one. So they rob a second bakery eight
years later. Are they vulnerable to a RICO prosecution?
Q. But how about [section] 1961 subsection 5, where it de-
fines pattern of racketeering activity as at least two acts of racke-
teering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years, in-
cluding any period of imprisonment. Wouldn't my brother Bren-
nan's example come under that?
Q. * * * [LIet's go into the business of robbery. * * * That
then would be an enterprise. * * * But the hypothetical I gave
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you, they were just isolated acts with no agreement between them
to make this a regular pattern of living.
Q. Let's take another one. A single individual who talks to
no one, but simply goes around to a series of pharmacies and says
to the proprietor, I want to buy X number of certain drugs, co-
caine and some others, without a prescription and you either give
them to me or your windows will be broken as fast as you can
replace them. And he goes around to ten establishments and gets
the cocaine and sells it. Is that an enterprise?
A. I think it would be, yes. I think it would be.
Q. Whether there's one, two or ten, it's an enterprise, is that
right?
Q. Well then in that bridge example we were talking about
earlier. The ladies would have to agree on the pattern of gam-
bling, would they, over the years?
Q. * * * [W]hy does your distinction between victim and
criminal enterprise itself necessarily answer our problem? Be-
cause is it not conceivable that you might have say, a neighbor-
hood numbers game, or a neighborhood prostitution business,
something like that. And a larger criminal element comes in and
by racketeering activities takes over that more or less local enter-
prise. Why doesn't the statute apply there and there the one
taken over would be the victim?
Q. Well maybe it wasn't an extortion, maybe it was just a-
using whatever these racketeering activities as defined in the stat-
ute are, just to take over an illegal enterprise? And I don't under-
stand why your distinction between victim and criminal helps us
at all in our analysis, because it seems to me you can have an
illegal enterprise, that would also be a victim of a takeover by a
larger illegal enterprise.
Q. In the hypothetical I put to your friend about the individ-
ual, just one man, who goes around to the-a dozen pharmacies
and says you sell me 500 units of cocaine every week, or your
windows will be broken. You say that would not be covered be-
cause that's one person, and it's totally illegal from the start, it
has no legal front. What do you say about that?
Q. * * * [Tihe first category under Subsection (4) is an indi-
vidual, partnership, and then the whole array, seriatim. Why
weren't they trying to get at this one strong-armed extortionist?
Q. In your eusdem argument, or argument under the defini-
tion, you assume as I understand it, the first listed things like
partnership, corporation, association, would necessarily be legiti-
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mate. But is it not possible that a corporation could be organized
and do nothing but deal in goods or stolen securities or some-
thing like that, and be wholly illegitmate. Would you say that
even a corporate, a corporation so organized and totally illegiti-
mate would not be an enterprise within the meaning of the
statute?
Q. Let's suppose something less. Let's suppose that if some
group, one or twenty-one people, set up a specialty of collecting
illegal debts. That is, usurious debts, gambling debts, any other
kind, and that's all they do. You say they are not covered?
A. I say they are not covered.
Q. You mean, they can't be prosecuted under this statute?
With one dissent, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the term
"enterprise" in RICO encompasses both legitimtate and illegitimate busi-
nesses. In doing so, the Court rejected the application of the rule ejusdem
generis.
One of the most interesting cases from the standpoint of hypothetical
questions was Plyer v. Doe.2 The issue was relatively simple: could
Texas, consonant with the Equal Protection Clause, pass a statute denying
a free public education to undocumented alien children?
Q. Let me ask one question, counsel. If the Equal Protection
Clause is not protective of undocumented aliens, could the State
of Texas impose harsher criminal penalties upon them?
Q. * * * [I]f you are dealing with commuters, people who
reside outside the district and come across just to go to school,
couldn't you handle that problem by just saying you must be a
resident of the district in order to attend the school?
Q. Well, does that mean that you assume * * * that these
children will remain in the school district because it is just too
much of an administrative burden to get them deported, so they
are going to be part of the community anyway, and you would
rather have them uneducated than educated?
Q. Suppose you say to INS [Immigration and Naturalization
Service], here are a dozen illegal aliens, why don't you deport
them and have them take their children with them? And they
say, sorry, we are too busy. And those dozen people buy prop-
erty. And I suppose there are a good many illegal aliens that
aren't destitute.
Q. Could Texas deny them fire protection?
21. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Q. Could Texas pass a law and say they cannot be protected
[from fire]?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Why not? If they could do this, why couldn't they do
that?
A. Because-I am going to take the position that this is an
entitlement of the-Justice Marshall, let me think a second.
You-that is-I don't know. That is a tough question.
Q. Somebody's house is more important than his child.
Q. You are talking about denying them all rights that every
other similarly situated person has, such as fire protection, police
protection, garbage collection, things like that. You could take
all those things away, it seems to me, under the state's argument.
Q. Let me suggest this. If a Virginian went to Texas to spend
a year, but had no intention of becoming a domiciliary of Texas,
would you allow him or her to attend a Texas public school for
free? * * * Let's say six months. To make it realistic, let's say
six months, for one term. Would you allow the Virginian to go to
the University of Texas tuition-free?
Q. Would you hazard a guess as to whether if one came to
Virginia from Texas, and his house was on fire three days after he
arrived, that Virginia would have any obligation to put the fire
out?
Q. Somebody who-if somebody can acquire a residence in a
day, whenever they come to the university, they become a resi-
dent immediately, don't they?
Q. * * * [B]efore you sit down, please, how do you compare
the children of the undocumented or illegal alien with the illegiti-
mate children that the Court considered in Laii /v. Laii22]? The
children themselves have a status over which they have no con-
trol, the children of these illegal aliens. Does the Texas statute
then punish these children for something over which they have
absolutely no control?
Q. Well, if the Court were to find that [the] Equal Protection
Clause applies to these children, then how do we deal with the
question of these children with relation to children such as illegit-
imate children? Do we have to apply then a heightened standard
if equal protection applies?
Q. * * * Suppose we have Mr. Justice Powell's Virginian
going down to the University of Texas as a visiting professor, but
22. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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he has three elementary school children. He is going to be there
for six months. Do you let them into your public schools?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Do you charge them for it?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. The father and family has a legal right, a legal residence,
and a legal domicile within our borders.
Q. Well, he doesn't intend to stay there.
Q. So if he were a visiting professor from the University of
Mexico in Mexico City, you would have no problem?
Q. Could Texas pass a law denying admission to the schools
of children of * * * escaped convicts? * * *
A. I am sure they could pass a law. I don't know-
Q. Would it be constitutional?
A. No, it would not. I don't see a rational basis. You are
talking about all kinds of constitutional problems.
Q. We are dealing with children. I mean here is a child that
is the son of a murderer, but he can go to school, but the child
that is the son of an unfortunate alien cannot?
A. Basically-
Q. Who even pays his taxes. The aliens, you know, they pay
taxes, too.
Q. All right. Can a child of an alien who has no authority to
be in the United States of any kind, and the child is not born
here, can that child become a domiciliary?
Q. But can any person who is here in violation of an Act of
Congress be a de facto legal resident if the Act of Congress says
he is not a legal resident.
Q. May I ask you, would it be contrary to federal law if state
authorities when they found aliens who were illegally in the
country to escort them to the border and tell them to go home? Is
that contrary to federal law?
Q.* * * But suppose just as a self-held matter, the state es-
corted people to the border. Do you think that is contrary to-
they would have no authority to do that?
Q. What about a posse comitatus, where a judge is theoreti-
cally, he may have difficulty doing it, but he is entitled to call
upon bystanders to enforce an order of a court. Wouldn't the
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people escorting these people to the border be much like a posse
comitatus? They are not officially endowed with status, but they
are helping to enforce a federal statute?
Q. So you think if the State of Texas passed a law that said
aliens illegally in the country may not be employed, that it would
be unconstitutional?
Q. If Texas is giving-is required to give free bilingual edu-
cation to all the illegals who want to come to the United States
from Mexico, which they apparently can do almost without any
limit or hindrance, does that tend to encourage or discourage the
continuance of this illegal migration north?
Q. * * * [A]re you arguing that even if this statute were to
be regarded as implementing a federal policy to exclude illegal
aliens, even so regarded, that nevertheless, you are entitled to a
holding that the Equal Protection Clause renders the statute un-
constitutional, even if it is implementing of a federal policy?
A. If there were an express federal policy excluding-
Q. I know. Take my hypothetical. Not if there were. As-
sume that there is an express federal policy, and that this statute
implements that policy.
A. If there were an express federal policy saying undocu-
mented children should not attend school, then it would be our
position that Texas might well be able to-
Q. That is not my question * * *. My question is, if the fed-
eral policy is to exclude illegal aliens from the United States, and
this statute is to be regarded as implementing that federal policy,
are you arguing that nevertheless the statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause?
Q. * * * [L]et me interrupt you to ask a refinement of Jus-
tice Brennan's question. You answered, when he said, supposing
that the state statute implements the federal policy of keeping
aliens, unlawfully admitted aliens out, you said you would never-
theless make the equal protection claim. Would you make the
same argument if you-if it were demonstrated that the state stat-
ute substantially implements the federal policy, not just theoreti-
cally or minimally, but if it could be shown that there is a
substantial deterrent as a result of a state statute?
Q. I am not talking about-if this statute, just denying them
an education, substantially furthered that federal policy, would
you say that still was a violation of equal protection? You can
just say yes or no.
Q. I take it then you would say that if Congress passed a law
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saying, pursuant to our power to control immigration and natu-
ralization, we hereby forbid states to offer education to illegal
alien persons, people who are here illegally, would you say that
would violate equal protection? Would it be the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment, or not?
Q. * * * The federal government passes a law that says no
illegal aliens shall be educated by the states. Would that violate
equal protection?
Q. You spoke a while ago of a fifteen-year-old who came to
the country when he was six. Is Texas required to grant him ad-
mission to all its state universities and graduate schools as a resi-
dent, or could they charge him nonresident tuition?
Q. I am just asking about university, undergraduate and
graduate schools. If they charge nonresidents of Texas three
times as much as residents of Texas to make the stakes high, must
they admit this illegal [alien] on a Texas residence rate?
The Court ruled five to four that the Texas statute was unconstitutional.
Undocumented aliens are persons "within the jurisdiction" of Texas, as
provided in the Equal Protection Clause, and therefore entitled to the full
range of obligations imposed by the state's civil and criminal laws. This is
particularly true when applied to education and to minor children who
have not themselves engaged in unlawful conduct.
The case illustrates that hypotheticals and the answers to them can be-
come significant in the minds of the Justices. In a footnote in its opinion,
the Court observed:
Appellant School District sought at oral argument to charac-
terize the alienage classification contained in § 21.031 as simply a
test of residence. We are unable to uphold § 21.031 on that basis.
Appellants conceded that if, for example, a Virginian or a legally
admitted Mexican citizen entered Tyler [County] with his school-
age children, intending to remain only six months, those children
would be viewed as residents entitled to attend Tyler
schools. * * * It is thus clear that Tyler's residence argument
amounts to nothing more than the assertion that illegal entry,
without more, prevents a person from becoming a resident for
purposes of enrolling his children in the public schools. A State
may not, however, accomplish what would otherwise be prohib-
ited by the Equal Protecton Clause, merely by defining a disfa-
vored group as nonresident.[23]
This process of posing hypotheticals can sometimes be turned on the
23. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 n.22 (citations omitted).
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Court. During the argument in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,24 I
was attempting to demonstrate why the courts should not countenance a
prior restraint on the press, prohibiting it in advance from publishing the
facts surrounding a crime during the defendant's preliminary hearing. I
posed this to the Court:
Let us just suppose for a moment that every minister, priest,
and rabbi in Lincoln County had gotten--every one of them had
gotten together a couple of weeks before this gentleman's trial
and they had decided that [the defendant] was the embodiment
of the devil and that they were going to have to do something
about him, were going to make him a symbol, and that they were
going to get together on Sunday and Saturday in their pulpits
and they were going to reveal his confession, they were going to
reveal the sexual nature of his crimes, they were going to con-
demn him as guilty, and they were going to ask for the death
penalty.
And in order for me to make my point, if you will assume with
me that the overwhelming majority of the people in Lincoln
County went to their churches and synagogues that next Sunday,
is there any question [as to whether] this Court would sanction a
prior restraint on the giving of those sermons. I don't think any
judge would say that you can enjoin those people from getting up
in their pulpits and talking about his confession.
* * * And yet, as you pointed out, Mr. Justice Stewart, in
your Yale speech, the press is the one private organization that is
singled out and mentioned specifically as entitled to protection
under the First Amendment.
My hypothetical must at least have gotten the Court's attention, because
these follow-up questions were immediately asked:
Q. What if the president of the Lincoln County Bar Associa-
tion had done what your hypothetical calls for the priests, rabbis,
and pastors doing-had a meeting of the Lincoln County Bar
Association?
Q. * * * [W]hat if your ministers had also agreed that they
would advocate lynching the man, could a prior restraint be per-
mitted then?
Q. Well, how is the president of the Lincoln County Bar As-
sociation any better off if he is called up on contempt and fined
24. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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$500 than if he is preliminarily enjoined, cited for contempt when
he makes the speech, and fined $500 for civil contempt?
I considered these questions as offering a real opportunity to expand on
my views. Yet when the attorney representing the pregnant minor in the
Matheson case, cited above, attempted the same tactic of posing his own
hypotheticals, here is how he was met:
A. * * * The statute said she gains her majority. But in
terms of the question I was asked, what happens if she is sixteen,
marries someone who is sixteen, and you send notice to the six-
teen-year-old husband * * *. Okay. If three weeks later they get
a divorce, it's determined that the marriage was a mistake. Then
it's not-
Q. Well, we don't have that case.
A. We don't. No, we don't. But the problem is that this stat-
ute says, you notify the parents of all women, including-this
case, let's say there's that sixteen-year-old, if there is a divorce
and she now suddenly finds out she's pregnant three or four
weeks later, who do you notify? The statute says, her parents.
Q. We don't need to worry about that problem now, do we?
III. CONCLUSION
Even from the relatively few hypotheticals cited in the cases above, one
can generalize about what the advocate must anticipate from today's
Court.
Some questions are quite complex. In Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal, the attorney had to grasp a hypothetical fact situation involving $100
million, $1 million, $99 million, and $79 million. In Bulington, counsel
was asked to absorb the fact that a jury was finding both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, with the mitigating outweighing the aggravating,
and the state pressing the same evidence on retrial. And in J Truett Payne
Co., a Justice posed two dealers selling both Chrysler and General Motors
cars, with Chrysler and General Motors agreeing to charge higher prices to
one dealer than to the other, but with both dealers continuing to sell 500
cars apiece.
Similarly, some questions are confusing, particularly for counsel en-
gaged in the heat of argument. In Pico, there was the long query about the
school board appointing a committee with guidelines, the committee re-
porting back, the board removing three books and keeping five or six, and
an impartial observer agreeing that the standards had been followed-all
ending with, "What constitutional right of whom has been violated?" In
In re R.MJ., an attorney was accused of doingA and B, it was found that
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he had done A and B, but he constitutionally could be prevented from
doing only A-after which, the question was whether the Stromberg rule
would apply. And this one from Turkette: "If an individual may be an
enterprise and a group of persons who commit a pattern of activities, that
is, two predicate acts, may also be an enterprise, then how-what is the
difference between them and an illegal enterprise?"
Many hypotheticals are short and to the point, but others can be quite
lengthy. Only one-half hour is alloted to each side for oral argument in
today's Supreme Court. This may be reduced if argument on one side is
divided. These time restrictions pose special problems for the advocate.25
There is often a limited opportunity to make a cohesive and coherent state-
ment and still answer all of the Court's questions-hypothetical or other-
wise. Therefore, in preparing for argument, counsel must take into
account that much time will be devoted to questions, and that some ques-
tions may take a good deal of time simply to state-time that is treated as
"counsel time." One of the questions cited above in the Pico case, for
example, was 142 words long.
One cannot help but be impressed with how far removed some hy-
potheticals are from the facts before the Court. In Ross, the brown paper
bag case, one Justice had the police hunting for a waffle iron. In Flipside,
dealing with head shops, an ordinance was posed that prohibited the sale
without a license of pistols with barrels of less than five inches. In the
health services case, Blue Cross of Kansas City, a Justice came up with
$500 in matching grants to build additional law schools. The ban against
students' use of campus facilities for religious services in Widmar turned
into Pope John Paul II's Mass on the Mall. And Plyler, the undocumented
alien children case, developed into a Texan having his house on fire in
Virginia, state authorities escorting aliens to the border and telling them to
go home, followed by a judge calling on a posse comitatus to get rid of
them.
Some questions, such as those relating to the ten-year-old girl with med-
ical or psychiatric problems in Matheson, could have and should have
been anticipated. But what of the sign reading, "Forget your troubles, es-
cape from your anxieties," in F1ipside; the campus in the middle of the
desert in Widmar; or the jury with one member who was not a citizen in
Bullington? Certainly the Court deserves high marks for imagination. Not
every judge would have come up with the bridge clubs playing for money
25. See Prettyman, Supreme Court Advocacy: Random Thoughts in a Day of Time Re-
strictions, 4 LITIGATION MAG. No. 2, 1978, at 16.
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in Turkette, the Hospital Opportunists Association in Blue Cross of Kansas
City, the one-man religion in Thomas, or the murderer's child in Plyler.
Finally, one must recognize the difficulty involved in answering some of
these questions. How does one respond to the issue of privacy interests
when powdered sugar is found in a brown paper bag, in Ross? And the
two men who robbed a bakery, never saw each other for eight years, and
ran into each other and agreed to rob a second bakery posed serious
problems for both sides in Turkette. The same applies to the individual,
also in Turkette, who bought drugs on threat of breaking windows from
ten different establishments. Almost all of the hypotheticals in Plyler were
difficult, not so much as a matter of law, but as a matter of common sense.
How to defend denying a free education to the children of undocumented
aliens while at the same time putting out fires in their houses or educating
the children of murderers?
All in all, this trend to hypotheticals makes for a more difficult time on
the part of the advocate and a more scintillating, enervating time on the
part of the observer. The ultimate winners are the Justices, who really are
advanced by this probing technique to test the outer limits of their poten-
tial decisions.
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